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HEALTH IMPROVEMENTS IN COSTA RICA: THE SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
Costa Rica has enjoyed remarkable and sustained health 
improvements. The accomplishments have been reflected in all 
major health indicators, and progress has been significant, both 
in comparison with other less developed countries (LDCs) and over 
time. The gains have gone beyond what could have been predicted 
from per capita income levels. In several aspects, Costa Rica's 
health standards have rapidly approached those of the most 
advanced nations. This paper attempts to describe the socio-
economic background that has made this possible. 
Costa Rica's successful progress in health care has been 
reflected in substantial reductions in mortality rates (1,2). 
During the first half of the century, the country's gross 
mortality rate declined from 30 (1910-1920) to 12 per thousand 
-(1950-55). This mortality rate further decreased to 4 per 
thousand by 1980, reflecting both the age structure of the 
population and major health gains. As a result, life expectancy 
increased from 41 (1929) to 56 (1950) and to 74 years (1982). 
Rapid gains in life expectancy took place before 1950 (an average 
annual gain of 0.71 years during 1929-50), and marginal progress 
continued to be strong even after mortality had been substanti-
ally reduced. During 1960-78, Costa Rica gained 0.44 years of 
life expectancy per annum. Most of the beneficiaries of these 
gains have been the young (and the newborn), who constitute a 
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large proportion of the population. As expected, female mortality 
rates have been lower. The reduction in mortality rates has not 
been uniform: as of 1973, there was a 7-8 year difference in life 
expectancy between the province with the lowest and the three 
provinces with the highest life expectancy. 
Infant mortality has experienced remarkable reductions (3). 
This rate declined from 90 (1950) to 19 per thousand (1980), with 
the greatest gains taking place during the 1970s (since this rate 
was still 63 per thousand in 1970). This has been particularly 
significant, in view of the low incidence of abortion in Costa 
Rica (4). Obviously, the risk of death has been higher for 
children living in the country ''s periphery (outside of the 
Central Valley). As of 1968-69, the probability of death before 
the first two years of life was 93 per thousand for rural 
children and 62 per thousand in the urban areas (5,6). The recent 
expansion of the rural infrastructure and the provision of public 
services into the country's remote areas has helped to close this 
gap. Most of the decline in infant mortality rates has been 
associated with the control of diarrheal diseases and respiratory 
infections, reflecting the expansion of sanitation, immunization, 
and other mother-and-child care services. Infant malnutrition has 
~lso declined substantially from 13.5 percent of children up to 6 
years old in 1966 to 4.1 percent in 1982, while acute malnutrition 
has ceased to be a serious public-health problem (7,8). By 1980, 
the per capita.intake of calories was 116 percent of daily 





The explanation of this favorable evolution is complex and 
no one single factor can account for it. Rather, the gains have 
resulted from a combination of several, different but mutually 
dependent circumstances, that have reinforced one another. some 
of the determinants of success have been associated with the 
general socioeconomic envi~onment and have their roots in the 
long-term history of the country: others have responded to 
specific events and actions. The country's social organization 
and political system, its size and the geographical patterns of 
settlement, and rapid economic growth deserve special attention. 
Income growth has made progress in education, communications, 
transportation, and the provision of electricity, water, and 
other basic services possible. Specific determinants, in turn, 
have included the large allocation of public expenditures to 
health-related activities, particularly to primary health care, 
human capital formation (both in general and through training of 
medical personnel) and physical investment (installations and 
equipment), the choice of medical technologies, and the design 
and implementation of particular programs. The accomplishments 
have been made possible only through the combination of the 
country's overall social and economic development with approp-
riate resource allocations, technological choices, and policy 
design. The gains have reflected a sustained effort over time, 
where improvements in one dimension have reinforced progress in 
others. Frequently the effects of health policies and interven-
tions have long gestation periods and many are reversible. Costa 
Rica's experience suggests the need for a simultaneous push on 
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several fronts, sustained but flexible, innovative and adapted to 
changing circumstances. 
Socio-Political Framework 
Costa Rica is widely considered to be one of the most 
democratic countries in the world (10). The country has enjoyed 
an exceptionally well-ordered political system, characterized by 
honest, scrupulously supervised elections, prohibition of 
presidential re-election, balancing powers, and responsiveness to 
popular needs. Except once, since 1948 the opposition has always 
won elections. The elected leiislature has been strong, civil 
liberties fully observed, and the constitution designed to check 
political power. Most importantly, there has been no military 
organization even potentially capable of exerting influence (the 
army was banned by the constitution in 1948, while the police 
force has been weak and respectful of human rights). There has 
been a long tradition of general attachment to legal ways and of 
nonviolence. The roots of this democratic system go back to 
coloniaY times, when the isolated farmers of the Central Valley 
worked their own land for lack of Indians to enserf or of a 
precious-metal surplus to export. over time, democracy became and 
has remained a matter of national pride, and with the country's 
educational system, Costa Rica's most important claim to distinc-
tion (11) 
Although landholding and wealth have been concentrated (less 
so than in most LDCs), there has been a comparatively large 
-.. 
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middle class, and the proportion of the population in absolute 
poverty has been relatively small (12). While in 1969, 10.8 
percent of the Latin American population was below a poverty line 
of US$ 50 per year, Costa Rica showed the lowest proportion, of 
2.3 percent. For a poverty line of USS 75, the proportion 
increased to 17.4 percent for the 17 countries in Latin America, 
but only to 8.5 percent in Costa Rica (compared, for example, to 
58.5 percent in Ecuador). Culturally and ethnically, the popula-
tion has been particularly homogeneous, and women have enjoyed 
more equality than in most Latin American countries. There have 
been no serious ideological, racial, or regional divisions, no 
influence of a military establishment, and not even exceptional 
riches. 
Democratic politics have determined economic and social 
policies. A major element of the country's development strategy 
has been the emphasis on equity and on generalized improvements 
in the quality of life. This emphasis has been reflected in major 
-public investments in education, health, nutrition, social 
security, assistance to poor families, and other public-sector 
services~ The country has enacted an extensive social legis-
lation, including universal provision of services in health, 
education, and family-income assistance. The concern for equity 
has reflected the nature of the political system, that has 
encouraged participation and the open debate of issues. There 
has always beeri an active opposition to question public policies, 
with ample access to a free press, and successive governments of 
different persuasion have preserved and enhanced social equity. 
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Health improvements have reflected the growth-cum-equity 
policies generated by political stability, homogenity, and 
democratic traditions. Ample opportunities for upward mobility, 
modernization, and a social environment in which freedom is 
valued and practiced have not only guaranteed access to services, 
but have also fueled the demand for those services. Costa Rican 
have become used to improvements in education, health and 
nutrition and to defend access to them as acquired rights. 
Economic growth has made their supply feasible. Growth has 
generated the resources required for human capital formation and 
the provision of public-sector goods; while increased household 
incomes have made it possible to cover the opportunity costs (of 
time, transportation, food, and other expenses) associated with 
their demand. This has been particularly true for education. 
Higher incomes have also allowed households to pay for complemen-
tary expenses (medicines, food, etc.), better housing, and 
healthier environments. 
Public investment has resulted in the development of a 
physical infrastructure for the benefit of most Costa Ricans. 
With large amounts of foreign. assistance, Costa Rica has built an 
impressive network of highways and feeder roads, electric power, 
and telecommunications system (13). The life of peasants has been 
transformed by roads and buses, water supplies and electricity 
reaching into all corners, telephones in all rural villages, 
agricultural extension, health and sanitary services, reliable 
mail delivery,~ and newspapers, radio, and even television, which 
have found their way into most peasant homes (14). The proportion 
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of the population with potable water at home increased from 53 
percent in 1950 to 84 percent in 1980, while the proportion with 
sewage disposal augmented from 48 to 93 percent during the same 
period. The proportion of households with electricity grew from 
40 to 79 percent, while the proportion of households with radio 
reached 95 percent and the proportion of those with television 
reached 79 percent by 1980. During those three decades, per 1,000 
persons, the number of telephones grew from 11 to 70, the number 
of automobiles from 9 to 63, and the number of newspapers from 85 
to 118. 
Although the major beneficiaries of economic growth and of 
the public-sector services provided have been the swelling 
middle-income groups, the poor increasingly shared in the fruits 
of development, at least until the financial crisis of the early 
1980s. Certainly, the equity-oriented system has been expensive, 
and a large bureaucracy has evolved to administer it (13). While 
the accompanying financial burden may have contributed to the 
-fiscal crisis, the constraints imposed by this crisis have 
resulted in an increasing proportion of shrinking available 
-
resources being devoted to paying employees, at the expense of 
the benefits reaching target populations. 
Health Policies 
Costa Rica has devoted a substantial proportion of its 
resources to health services as well as to other activities 
(education, housing, transportation, etc.) that directly 
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influence health levels (15). Available information is not very 
reliable and comparisons across sources are difficult. The world 
Bank reports an increase in the proportion of health expenditures 
from 4 (1972) to 30 percent (1981) of central government expendi-
tures (9). Combining health and housing, social security, and 
welfare expenditures, this proportion rose from 30 to 4-0 percent, 
while the proportion devoted to education dropped from 28 to 24 
percent. Andie, on the basis of IMF statistics, computed a 
proportion for health that increased to 4.6 percent in 1976, and 
then declined (16). Social security and welfare expenditures 
represented 24.7 percent and education 27.2 percent in 1976. 
On the other hand, Lizano and Cespedes estimated that health 
expenditures rose to amount 11 percent of the GDP in 1980. The 
trend towards increasing ratios of health expenditures to the GDP 
and augmenting per capita expenditures has been reversed with 
the recent financial crisis (17). 
Special attention has been devoted to educating doctors and 
medical technicians. The effort has been carried out mostly by 
the schools of Medicine and of Nursing at the University of Costa 
Rica and, more recently, at the private university (UACA). The 
autonomous institution in charge of social security (CCSS) has 
sponsored numerous training programs as well as scholarships for 
study abroad~ The training of intermediate health technicians has 
also played a crucial role. As a result, per 10,000 persons, the 
number of physicians increased from 3.1 in 1950 to 7.8 in 1980, 
and the population per nurse declined from 720 in 1960 to 450 in 
1980 (9). The development of human resources has been accompanied 
by the expansion of physical facilities and other material 
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resources, particularly during the 1970s (15). The number of 
health-related facilities (hospitals, peripheral clinics, and 
health centers) increased from 400 in 1973 to 944 in 1977 (18). 
These human and material resources have contributed to 
observed gains through ambitious and well-conceived policies. In 
the absence of appropriate policies these resources would have 
been wasted (17). These policies have included programs in 
preventive medicine, child-and-mother care, primary health care, 
healthier environment, and nutrition, in addition to the 
social-security efforts. 
Costa Rica enjoys one of the most comprehensive social 
security systems among LDCs (19). The ccss was established in 
1942 and began to offer medical and maternity insurance to 
selected classes of workers, as well as a pension program, both 
financed by contributions (as set percentages of wages) by 
workers, employers, and the government. The health-care program 
already reached 20 percent of the economically active population 
by 1948, a proportion that was almost doubled by 1970 (38 
percent). At that time, these services reached 46 percent of the 
total population. The ccss coverage accelerate during the 1970s 
and by 1980 it reached 69 percent of the economically active 
population and their families (78 percent of the total population). 
All hospitals and health-care establishments were transferred to 
the ccss in 1973, which became the country's most powerful 
institution (l~). Access to health services was increased by 
. . 
'• ... ; .. 
breaking geographical barriers, throug'lr'"the expansion of the 
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physical infrastructure, cultural barriers, through education, 
and economic barriers, through universal coverage of the ccss 
services. 
Education 
The educational effort constitutes, in addition to the 
political system, Costa Rica's differential feature in Latin 
America. Education was given a high priority from the earlier 
days of the republic (20). By 1869, the country's liberal 
ideology was incorporated in a constitution that declared primary 
education free and compulsory ahd a main responsibility of the 
state. Free education was expanded to the secondary level in 1949. 
The illiteracy rate was reduced from 69 percent of the population 
10 years old and older in 1892, to 30 percent in 1912, already a 
low proportion even in comparison with many of today's LDCs. 
Having declined to 21 percent by 1950, the illiteracy rate 
further decreased to 10 percent by 1913. There have practically 
been no differences with respect to literacy between the sexes 
(by 1973-the illiteracy rate was 10.2 percent for men and 10.3 
percent for women). on the other hand, by 1973 the illiteracy 
r.ate was 4 percent in the urban centers and 15 percent in the 
rural areas, but the rapid continued decline in illiteracy has 
further closed the gap. Moreover, the proportion of the popula-
tion 10 years old or older with less than three completed years 




According to the world Bank, the number enrolled in primary 
school, as a percentage of their age group, increased from 96 to 
108 percent during 1960-80 (9). There have been no significant 
sex differences in primary education enrollment. The number 
enrolled in secondary school as a proportion of their age group 
rose from 21 to 48 percent during the same period, while the 
number enrolled in higher education as a percentage of the 
population 20 to·24 years old went up from 5 to 26 percent. The 
proportion of women 20 to 34 years old who had completed primary 
education increased from 22 to 66 percent during 1950-80. Census 
data show remarkable progress between 1963 and 1973 in those 
provinces with the lowest levels of education, significantly 
closing geographical gaps (20). 
As indicated, substantial resources have been allocated to 
education. These allocations increased from about 25 percent of 
government expenditures in the late 1950s to 35 percent in the 
late 1960s and declined to 25 percent in the late 1970s, as other 
social expenditures grew faster. By the late 1960s, educational 
expenses amounted to 17 percent of the GDP. one cannot overempha-
size the-major impact of these expenditures and of the long-term 
educational achievements on health improvements. Education makes 
tbe population more receptive to the better-health message. The 
explosion of communications, facilitated by improved education, 
multiplies the frequency of the message. In a free and open 
sociopolitical environment, the message is translated into a 
demand for health services. Education and concern for human 
rights result in a more trusting and respectful doctor-patient 
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relationship. Increased productivity and incomes, as a result of 
better education, facilitate payment for the better services 
demanded. They also make possible more rapid human capital 
formation in the health sector. Increased education, moreover, 
leads to a decline in fertility and to better maternal care. 
Progress in these two fronts is closely linked. 
Development strategy, Growth, and structural Transformation 
Two main characteristics of the Costa Rican economy are its 
small size, with the limitations imposed by a poor domestic 
market, and its high degree of openness to foreign trade. With a 
population of 2.5 million and a per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) of about US$ 1,500, Costa Rica is a very small economy. 
Given a specialized resource base and a small domestic market, 
trade with other countries has acted as the economy's engine of 
growth. Much of the impulse for growth during this century has 
been provided by· exports of agricultural commodities. Exports of 
coffee, bananas, cacao, sugar, and beef have raised the country's 
capacity to import and levels of output, and have yield many of 
the dynamic benefits from specialization (21). 
Costa Rica is a very open economy. During the past three 
decades, exports have represented between one fifth and one third 
of the GDP and this proportion has increased over time. Imports 
have represented between one-quarter and one-half of the GDP, 
with a similar-increasing trend. Costa Rica exports mainly 
primary products. About two-thirds of the agricultural output 
- 13 -
have been exported in recent times, which has generate at least 
two thirds of the country's foreign exchange earnings. Some 
diversification has taken place, however. The relative importance 
of coffee declined from 49 percent (1957) to 24 percent of total 
exports (1980), whereas the share of bananas dropped from 39 
percent (1957) to 20 percent of the total (1980). Trade has also 
played an important role in the development of manufacturing. 
When Costa Rica joined the Central American Common Market (CACM) 
in 1963, manufactured goods represented only 4 percent of total 
exports, but this proportion grew to 29 percent by 1979. About 
four-fifths of these exports have gone to the CACM, rather than 
into competitive world markets (22,23) 
The Costa Rican economy grew at a very satisfactory pace 
since the 1960s. In constant 1966 prices, between 1960 and 1980 
the GDP grew at an average rate of 5.8 percent per annum. There 
has been a tendency, however, for this rate of growth to decline, 
from an average annual rate of 7.0 percent for 1965-70, to 5.2 
percent for 1975-80, and to negative rates in the early 1980s. 
This tendency towards slower growth has been shared by all major 
sectors of economic activity. Thus, the average rate of growth of 
the agricultural GDP dropped from 8.1 percent per annum for 
1965-70, to 1.8 percent for 1975-80, whereas the average rate of 
growth of GDP in manufacturing declined from 9.3 percent per 
annum for 1965~70, to 6.0 percent for 1975-80. The more rapid 
deceleration of the agricultural output reflected, in part, the 
penalization of exports and of agriculture that resulted from the 
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choice of a strategy of industralization and import substitution, 
reinforced when Costa Rica joined the CACM. 
As a consequence of the growth of productivity in the 
agricultural sector and of the protectionist strategy of 
industrialization, the Costa Rican economy has experienced 
important structural changes (22). The relative importance of the 
agricultural sector has declined substantially, while the share 
of other sectors, with the exception of commerce, has increased. 
The most dynamic sectors have been manufacturing, personal 
services, and the central government. The most significant 
structural transformation had already taken place before 1960. 
Between 1950 and 1960, the share of agriculture declined 14.9 
percentage points, from an original level of 40.9 percent of the 
GDP. During the 1960s this share declined only 3.5 points, and an 
additional loss of 4.7 points took place during the 1970s, 
bringing this share down to 17.8 percent by 1980. The contribution 
of agriculture to GDP increased both during the "coffee boom" and 
the recent crisis. 
The sharp reduction in the relative importance of agricul-
ture during the 1950s was not due to the expansion of manufac-
turing, whose contribution to the GDP gained only 0.8 points, but 
to the growth of the central government, whose share increased by 
3.6 points, and other public-sector related activities, such as 
water and electricity, transportation, and banking and finance. 
The most rapid increase in the share of manufacturing took place 
during the 1960s, after Costa Rica joined the CACM, with a gain 
of 4.4 points. Once the "easy" stage of import substitution was 
- 15 -
completed, during the 1970s the contribution of manufacturing to 
the GDP stagnated, to reach 18.6 percent by 1980. Once more, 
during the 1970s most of the decline in the relative importance 
of agriculture was not due to the expansion of manufacturing but 
of the central government, whose share gained 4.6 points. 
A substantial portion of the shifts in the relative contribu-
tions to the GOP resulted merely from price changes (the evolution 
of the domestic terms-of-trade among sectors). In real terms, 
during the 1960s the share of agriculture was fairly constant, 
but the terms-of-trade of the sector deteriorated, mostly as a 
consequence of the protectionist strategy of industralization 
(22). While agricultural prices were 11.3 percent lower in 1970 
than in 1957, the prices of manufactures were 37.7 percent 
higher. This implied a deterioration of 35.5 percent of the 
terms-of-trade of agriculture. During the 1970s, however, in real 
terms the contribution of agriculture to the GDP declined 6.1 
points, in response to the penalization introduced by the 
-
strategy, but this was reversed by the "coffee boom". In real 
terms, the share of the central government remained fairly 
constant over the three decades, but between 1957 and 1980 the 
terms-of-trade of this sector increased 147 percent. The deterior-
ation of the agricultural terms-of-trade therefore,has resulted 
not so much from increased industrial prices, but from increasing 
public sector wages. 
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The Recent Crisis 
In the early 1980s, Costa Rica was experiencing an acute 
economic crisis, characterized by declining output, growing 
unemployment, rampant inflation and rapid devaluation, large 
public-sector deficits and a huge public external debt (23). The 
difficulties were in sharp contrast with the remarkable progress 
of the previous ~ecades. The crisis was the result of both 
long-term structural trends and particularly unfavorable 
short-term circumstances (21). The structural determinants of the 
crisis reflected a contradiction between the country's basic 
economic characteristics and the features of the protectionist 
strategy of import substitution, as well as the growing role of 
the public sector in productive activities. These problems were 
accentuated by external shocks and by domestic policies adopted 
in response to the shocks. 
The protectionist strategy promoted the "inward-looking" 
development of manufacturing, conditioning the growth of this 
sector to the strength of the local demand. High growth rates 
during the 1960s and early 1970 resulted from the dramatic 
increase in central American trade after creation of the customs 
union. Eventually, the "easy" stage of import substitution was 
exhausted, l~ading to increasing stagnation of output and trade 
( 23). From a hi·gh of 8. 9 percent per annum, the growth rate of 
the GDP dropped to -9.1 percent in· 1982. In the case of agricul-
ture, this rate declined from 6.6 percent per annum (1978) to 
-4.9 percent (1982), and in the case of manufacturing, from 12.7 
percent (1977) to -14.9 percent (1982). 
- 17 -
The protectionist strategy distorted relative commodity 
prices, turning the domestic terms-of-trade against agriculture, 
and relative factor prices, favoring capital-intensive sectors 
and technologies and reducing the labor-absorptive capacity of 
the modern private sector. This forced the public sector to 
become an active employer, contributing to growing fiscal 
deficits. The inefficiencies brought about by these policies have 
been apparent in the structure of production, exacting high costs 
to domestic consumers, and limiting competitiveness in inter-
national markets. 
High levels of effective tariff protection were granted for 
the production of final consumer goods, while protection for raw 
materials, intermediate inputs, and capital goods was low and 
even negative (24.25). This resulted in a very import-intensive 
manufacturing sector. In order to produce US$ 100 worth of 
manufactures, Costa Rica needs at least US$ 60 worth of imported 
inputs. As a consequence, the Costa Rican economy has become less 
able to adjust to external shocks. By now, less than 15 percent 
of total imports represent final consumer goods. Thus, 
balance~of-payments adjustment implies the contraction of imports 
of raw materials, intermediate inputs, and capital goods, needed 
to keep manufacturing output growing.The consequences are 
stagnation and employment. The alternative is increased foreign 
debt (21). 
The short· term determinats of the crisis have included the 
two international oil shocks, the sharp increase and subsequent 
decline in the international prices of agricultural exports (the 
"coffee boom") and the world recession, changes in access to 
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international financial markets, and war, insurrection, and 
political instability in Central America which, in part, explain 
the deterioration of the CACM. The resulting sharp fluctuation in 
the country's international terms-of-trade substantially increased 
instability and faced Costa Rica with a major problem of adjustment. 
The international terms-of-trade deteriorated rapidly during 
the first oil shock (1973-74), to about 76 percent of their 1966 
level, but rapidly improved afterwards, to 115 percent, as a 
consequence of the "coffee boom". After 1978, these terms-of-trade 
declined again, to 69 percent in 1983. The extraordinary improvement 
in the terms-of-trade and the rapid expansion of exports during 
the "boom" significantly increased real incomes and the levels of 
consumption, public expenditure, and imports. Aggregate spending 
was further increased by borrowing abroad, even beyond the levels 
made possible by the exceptional export earnings. When the "boom" 
was over, as the country's terms-of-trade deteriorated again, 
demand for its traditional exports declined, and domestic and 
foreign investment contracted, real incomes fell, but the 
authorities chose to postpone the adjustment by further borrowing 
abroad. ~he country's external debt reached $1,600 per capita, 
while the increasing over-valuation of the domestic currency 
reduced the profitability of exports. 
In order to finance public-sector deficits, when foreign 
capital inflowi dried out, the authorities rapidly expanded 
domestic credit, creating strong inflationary pressures which, 
first led to the loss of the country's international monetary 
reserves, and then to inflation and devaluation. The rate of 
exchange went from 8.6 colones per US dollar in early 1980, to 65 
-. 
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colones per US dollar in mid-1982. By 1981, the rate of change of 
the consumer price index was 65 percent per annum and the rate of 
change of the wholesale price index was 117 percent. 
The speed with which the Costa Rican economy deteriorated 
was very dramatic. In a few years, an economy that was growing 
vigorously stagnated, the rate of unemployment doubled, secular 
price stability was followed by three-digit inflation, and the 
country experien6ed an unprecedented devaluation of its currency. 
Costa Rica also finds it very difficult to service the accumulated 
public external debt (26).In 1983-84, nevertheless, relative 
foreign-exchange rate and domestic price stability have been 
regained and growth has resumed, but the country is still far 
from having overcome the crisis or its consequences. 
The Labor Force 
Between 1960 and 1980, the rate of growth of the Costa Rican 
population dramatically declined, from a maximum of almost 3.9 
percent per annum, to about 2.4 percent. This decline was mostly 
due to reductions in fertility. Whereas around 1960, about 60 
percent of the population was 12 years old or older, this 
proportion had increased to 70 percent by 1980. During this two 
decades, the median age increased from 16 to 20 years. As a 
consequence, th~proportion of those in working ages (15 to 64 
years) augmented from 50 to 59 percent of the total population. 
During 1978-83, the rate of growth of this age group averaged 3.8 
percent per annum (27,28). 
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The labor force grew at an annual rate of 2.8 percent during 
1950-63 and of 3.7 percent during 1963-73, and continued to grow 
even more rapidly through 1978. In part, this has reflected 
increasing rates of participation by women (from 16 percent in 
1963 to 26 percent in 1979). Between 1963 and 1980, the average 
rate of growth of the female labor force was 6.8 percent per 
annum, more than twice the rate for the male labor force, of 3.2 
percent per annum. There has also been less active participation 
by the younger and older persons, as a result of expanding 
educational opportunities, family incomes, pension systems and 
welfare assistance. In turn, the dependency rate, that had 
increased from 2.0 (1950) to 2:4 (1963), declined to 1.9 (1980). 
During the 1970s the urban population grew more rapidly than 
the total population. In the most recent years, the rate of 
growth of the urban population was 4.2 percent per annum. As the 
result, the proportion of the urban population in the total, that 
had increased from 33 percent in 1950 to 41 percent in 1973, 
reached 46 percent by 1980. In earlier periods, when the agricul-
tural sector was larger, most of the domestic migration took 
place between different rural areas, usual!~ in search for new 
uncultivated land or to earn the higher wages of the banana 
plantations. Recently, however, the reduced availability of 
uncultivated· land and increasing urban-rural wage differentials 
have resulted in greater rural-urban migration, particularly to 
San Jose's Metropolitan Area. While during 1950-63, agriculture 
generated 35 percent of the new jobs in the economy, during 
1963-73 it offered only 11 percent of the new jobs. More recen-
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tly, employment in agriculture has actually declined. Thus, the 
proportion of the labor force residing in urban areas increased 
from 43 percent in 1973 to 48 percent in 1980 (28). 
While 55 percent of the employed labor force worked in 
agriculture in 1950, this proportion declined to 27 percent by 
1980. Ten years after Costa Rica joined the CACM, the relative 
share of manufacturing in employment had not changed much (from 
12 percent in 1963 to 13 percent in 1973). By 1980 this share 
reached only 16 percent, indicating the relative capital inten-
sity of production, induced by the protectionist strategy. 
Besides agriculture, the other large employer is the personal 
services sector, whose share increased from 18 percent in 1950 to 
24 percent in 1980, reflecting, in part, the expansion of 
public-sector employment. The most rapidly growing share was that 
of commerce, which augmented from 8 percent in 1950 to 18 percent 
in 1980. 
Employment in the public sector increased more than four 
times more rapidly than employment in the private sector during 
1950-63, and still during 1973-80 the former rate was more than 
twice the latter. This meant that the share of the public sector 
in total employment increased from 6 percent in 1950 to 20 
percent in 1980. This has reflected implicit policies to keep 
unemployment low and has contributed to the fiscal disequilibrium 
that has been at the roots of the recent crisis. The constraints 
on the capacity of sector to absorb employment during the crisis 
explain the increasing rates of unemployment observed. Open 
unemployment had increased from 4.1 percent of the labor force in 
1950 to 7.3 percent in 1973, but then declined to 4.5 percent by 
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1978. with the crisis, this rate reached 9.5 percent by 1982. 
When visible underemployment is added, this rate increased from 
7.5 percent in 1976 to 14.6 percent in 1981. 
Poverty and Income Distribution 
In constant 1966 prices, during 1957-80 per capita GDP grew 
at an average rate of 2.3 percent per annum. Little was gained 
during 1957-65, when the average rate was 0.3 percent per annum, 
mostly due to high population growth. A much higher rate of 3.8 
percent, observed during 1965-70 reflected the initial impact of 
increased trade within the CACM. This rate was not maintained 
during 1970-75, when the averaged 1.4 percent per annum, as the 
strategy became exhausted. The "coffee boom" explains an annual 
rate of 4.7 percent during 1975-80, followed by sharp declines 
during the crisis. By 1980, real per capita GDP was 67 percent 
higher than in 1957. Most of this growth, however, was recent. 
By 1970, per capita GDP was only 24 percent higher than in 1957, 
while the 1980 level was 35 percent higher than the 1970 level. 
During the crisis, per capita GDP declined by 19 percent. 
Although uneven, this growth resulted in a significant improve-
ment of the average standard of living of Costa Ricans and made 
possible substantial attempts to redistribute income and to 
reach the poor~with many basic services. 
Available information suggests that the distribution of 
household income experienced a significant change during the 
1960s (28,29). Families with intermediate incomes increased their 
relative participation in total income at the expense, mostly, of 
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the households with the highest incomes and, to a much lesser 
extent, of those with the lowest incomes. As a result, the Gini 
coefficient declined from 0.52 in 1961 to 0.44 in 1971. The share 
in income of the 10 percent richest dropped from 44 percent in 
1961 to 37 percent in 1971, while the share of the 10 percent 
poorest declined from 2.8 percent to 2.0 percent. Available 
evidence suggests, on the other hand, that concentration increased 
somewhat during the 1970s, improving the relative position of the 
richest 60 percent, with respect to the poorest 40 percent (30). 
Income inequality in Costa Rica is considered comparatively 
moderate. The Gini coefficient for the distribution of household 
income in 1971 (0.44} was at the midpoint of LDCs, but relatively 
low by Latin American standards (12). In addition, the proportion 
of families below an absolute poverty line of 250 constant 
colones per month fell from about 20 to 10 percent during the 
1960s. If the poverty line is instead drawn at 500 colones, the 
declined is even more marked, from 65 to 30 percent. ~hus, 
-
absolute poverty was being alleviated rapidly (31}. 
Families living in the rural areas show a more egalitarian 
distribution of income (28). By 1971, the Gini coefficient for 
the distribution of household income was 0.43 for the urban and 
a.37 for the rural areas. The national average household income 
was 48 percent higher than the rural average. Families with an 
average monthly-income of 200 constant colones included 37 
percent of the-urban and 77 percent of the rural households. That 
is, in Costa Rica the poor are more rural than urban. Non-farming 
families represented two-thirds of the rural poor (32). 
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The share of total taxes in national income increased from 
15 (1961) to 26 percent (1978). Herschell found that, while the 
tax burden has been strongly regressive, the incidence of public 
expenditures has been strongly progressive (33). In 1974, while 
the share of low-income groups in total tax payments was 27 
percent, their share as beneficiaries of public expenditures was 
55 percent. This increased the income of these households, which 
represented 52 percent of the total number and earned 21 percent 
of the total income, by another 74 percent. 
The share of labor in total factor payments has shown a 
steady tendency to increase, from 57 percent in 1960 to 65 
percent in 1979. This has been ·associated with the improvements 
in the shares of income accruing to ·the households in the middle 
groups of the distribution and has reflected the growth of 
public-sector employment, modernization, and the opportunities 
for upward mobility created by the structural transformation of 
the economy (28). 
Legal minimum wages were first mandated in 1933, and have 
been separately set for different sectors of economic activity 
and occupational categories (34). In general, however, during the 
1960s and 1970s, actual wage increases were greater than the 
·adjustments in minimum wages, particularly in the manufacturing 
and public sectors (35). While minimum industrial wages were 
adjusted by 3~ percent between 1964 and 1973, actual wages 
increased 100· percent, due to mobility towards higher-productivity 
occupations. Before 1973, the rate of unionization was lower than 
the rate of open unemployment, and only a small proportion of the 
labor force was being paid as low at the legal minimum. Wage 
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policies became more important after 1974, when inflation 
accelerated, and specific distributive goals were adopted. Since 
then, adjustment have been inversely related to existing wage 
levels, in order to narrow earning gaps (28). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, on average, wages paid in 
agriculture had been the lowest. By 1963 they represented 75 
percent of the national average and this dropped to 58 percent by 
1973, after the adoption of the protectionist strategy of 
industrialization. During the rest of the decade, however, 
agricultural wages grew faster (due to the "coffee boom") and by 
1981 represented 61 percent of the national average. Wages paid 
in basic services (electricity, water, transportation) and in 
other service sectors have been the highest, representing 1.2 
times the national average by 1981, while wages paid in manufactur-
ing have been close to the national average. During the 1970s, 
wages paid by the private sector have represented about 75 
percent of the national average and those paid in the public 
sector about 1.5 times this average (28). 
Access to Resources and Land Tenure 
Because of its temperate climate and fertile soil, the 
Central Valley has been the political, economic, and demographic 
center of the country. San Jose and three of the other most 
important cities are located there, in addition to numerous towns 
-
and villages and a dense rural population (36). The two other 
important cities are a port on each ocean. The small size of the 
country and the proximity of these rural areas to the urban 
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centers has reduced their rural character. Small size and 
proximity also have facilitated the provision of health-care 
services. About 56 percent of the country's population lives in 
the Central Valley, which covers only 15 percent of its territory, 
while 28 percent of the population in concentrated in San Jose. 
While average density is 188 inhabitants per square kilometer in 
the valley, it is only 19 inhabitants outside the valley. 
The country possesses few resources beyond its fertile soil, 
ample water for the production of both food and export crops and 
for power generation, and its well educated population. There are 
no important mineral resources and no oil deposits. Until 
recently, agricultural expansion was facilitated by the availabi-
lity of uncultivated land. Increases· in area cultivated were made 
possible by the development of the road network (27,750 kilo-
meters), and public-sector services. Nevertheless, the agricul-
tural frontier is now disappearing, and in the future increased 
output will require productivity increases (37). 
Middle-size farms have been important in the overall land 
distribut~on (28). Gini coefficients for land distribution were 
0.752 in 1950 and 0.758 in 1973. Redistribution has been attempt-
ed by the land-reform program created in 1962. In the early 
stages, landless farmers were settled in virgin lands by the 
government. Later, title was granted to occupants who had invaded 
government lands. In the early 1970s, cooperatives were created 
and land owned collectively. Finally, the program has dealt with 
integrated rural development in particular areas. Both public and 
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private farms have been purchased and distributed. By 1975, about 
2,130 households had benefited from these programs, at great 
expense. This number had increased to 7,690 households by 1980. 
concluding Remarks 
Health improvements in Costa Rica have been remarkable and 
sustained, resulting in substantial gains in life expectancy. 
Numerous factors have contributed to this achievement, complemen-
ting and reinforcing one another. This paper describes the 
nature of some of these determinants of success. Not all of them 
have been considered (even within the category of socioeconomic 
factors) and no effort has been made to measure their relative 
importance (14). Although some causal relationships have been 
suggested, none has been tested, formalized, or established. All 
of the data have been obtained from other sources and suffer (to 
a much lesser extent for the case of Costa Rica) from the 
-deficiencies typical of information in LDCs. 
It is clear that the extent of the achievements has reflected 
the complementarity of the multiple determinants: actual gains 
have been greater than the sum of expected results from isolated 
interventions. The technology for social progress thus slows 
substantial "economies of scope". Moreover, the "Costa Rican 
experience" hai not been a recent phenomenon1 even recent gains 
have resulted ·from a long gestation period and a sequence of 
preparatory accomplishments. Sustained efforts over a long 
period of time, a unique "social contract" that emphasizes 
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equity, and a successful mix of health and non-health policies 
and programs explain the wide range of the gains. 
The country's exceptional political system and homogeneous 
social structure have played a crucial role, directly and 
indirectly. This socio-political background explains the emphasis 
in education and Costa Rica~s more rapid long-term economic 
growth. Endowed with similar resources and of equivalent size, 
Costa Rica started from a disadvantaged economic position, in 
comparison to other central American countries, at the time of 
independence (1821). Ey 1950, income per capita was twice that of 
its neighbors, while wealth was more evenly distributed. social 
indicators showed an even greater gap. The absence of a military 
establishment has prevented the concentration of power and has 
released substantial resources for education and health. The 
concern for equity has reflected the country's democratic 
traditions and has influenced socioeconomic policies. ~reedom and 
an open society have generated strong demands for social services 
and have facilitated universal access to them. 
Public investment in infrastructure, human-capital forma-
tion, and basic services responded to these political demands and 
were made possible by rapid economic growth. The country's small 
size and the concentration of activity in the central Valley have 
reduced their costs, financed with important contributions of 
foreign assistance. water, sewage disposal, electricity, telephones, 
roads, newspapers, radio and television have reached all corners 
of the country, accompanying clinics and health centers. Successful 
technologies in primary health care (immunization, sanitation, 
.. 
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preventive medicine, etc.) have been adopted, while their 
effectiveness has been increased by education and increasing 
incomes to pay for their opportunity costs. substantial alloca-
tions of human and material resources have been channeled 
according to aggressive, flexible, and innovative policies. The 
country has also operated one of the most comprehensive social 
security systems among LDCs. Access to health care has been 
improved through the expansion of the physical infrastructure, 
education, and universal coverage with social security. 
Costa Rica's priority concern with education over many 
decades has been another major factor. schooling and low illiter-
acy have increased receptiveness to new ideas and the ability to 
implement them. Equal educational opportunities for both men and 
women (mothers) and the absence of significant urban-rural 
differentials in educational achievements have contributed to 
more uniform health gains. Poor-non-poor differentials in 
education have been negligible (32). Education has contributed to 
the multiplier effects of the explosion in communications, to the 
decline in fertility, and to increased labor productivity. 
Economic growth has provided the resources required to 
justify the political demands and to raise living standards. 
vuring 1950-80, Costa Rica experienced rapid growth, fueled by 
exports of primary products and, during a shorter period of time, 
by import-substitution industrialization within the CACM. A small 
domestic market has forced the country to rely on foreign trade 
as the engine of growth. The resulting openness of the economy, 
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in turn, has made it vulnerable to external shocks. As a con-
sequence, growth has been uneven. Development strategies and 
external factors have induced substantial structural transf or-
mations. The relative importance of agriculture in output and 
employment has declined, while that of the public sector has 
increased. 
structural deficiencies, a contradiction between the 
country•s development strategy and some of its economic charac-
teristics, and unfortunate external shocks and domestic policies 
resulted in the economic crisis of the early 1980s. output 
stagnated, unemployment increased, and inflation and devaluation 
brought about major wealth redistributions. Public-sector 
incursions into productive activities have jeopardized its 
ability to provide the social services Costa Ricans have become 
used to. Foreign borrowing, in order to postpone the adjustment, 
has compromised future growth, and debt service competes with 
basic services in the allocation of funds. The burden of a 
hypergrown public sector has been at-the roots of the financial 
crisis and raises questions about how far can poor-country 
governments attempt to do too much. There is not enough informa-
tion available about the impact of the crisis on health gains 
{apparently minor, so far), but many questions have been raised 
about the c6untry's ability to maintain its rhythm of social 
progress in the near future, in the face of a massive external 
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Table 1. Costa Rica: Demographic and Labor Force Indicators, 1950-1983. 
Population ('000) 
Density (Km2) 
Urban population (%) 
Median age (years) 
Population 12 years old 
and older (%) 
Birth .rates 
Annual growth rates: (%) 
Population 












Urban labor force (%)· 36.2 
Labor force participation 
rates: (%) 52.8 
Male (%) 90.3 
Female (%) 16.0 
Labor force ('OOO) 287 
Labor force as a propor-
tion of the total popul. 33.4 
Fertility rates 6.7 
Population in the Central 
Valley (%) 
Population in the Metro-
politan Area (%) 
Open unemployment (%) 
- means not available. 
55.8 
23 .9 


































































































Table 2. Costa Rica: Employment Indicators, 1950-1983. 
1950 1963 1973 1976 1980 1983 
Total employment ('OOO) 275 380 542 617 723 772 
Total unemployment ('000) 12 28 43 42· 45 77 
Shares in employment: (%) 
Private sector 93.9 86.7 84.7 83.2 80.3 82.l 
Public sec tor fi .1 13.3 15.3 16.8 19. 7 18.9 
Average annual rates of 
growth for the period: 
Total employment 2.5 3.6 4.4 4.0 2.2 
Private sector 1.9 3.4 3.8 3.1 2.5 
Public sector 8.8 5.1 1.1 8.2 0.9 
Shares in employment: (%) 
Agriculture 54.7 49.7 38.2 34.8 27 .4 28.3 
Manufacturing 11.3 11. 7 12.9 14.6 16.3 16.4 
Construction 4.3 5.5 6.9 6.5 7.8 5.2 
Basic Services 4.0 4.8 5.5 5.6 6.6 
Commerce 7.9 9.9 14.7 16.3 18.1 
Personal Services 17.8 18.4 21.8 22.2 23.8 
Average real wages (Index): 
Total 106 100 119 99 
Private sector . 107 100 121 107 
Public sector 106 100 110 90 
Workers' remunerations as 
a proportion of factor 
payments 57.2 60.8 61.0 65.4a 
Workers' remunerations as 
a proportion of national 
income 56.2 58.7 58.8 64.1 
-
a/ As of 1979. 
- means not available. 
Sources: References (21), (22) t (23), (26), (27). (28). 
.. ' ... 
Table 3. Costa Rica: International Trade and Financial Indicators, 1950-1983. 
Indicators 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 
Exports as a proportion of 
the GDP (~urrent prices) 27.6 25.0 21.4 22.8 28.2 30.4 27.3 
Exports as a proportion of 
the GDP (constant prices) 22.9 16 .1 21.4 21.8 34.2 36.4 35.6 38.9 
Imports as a proportion of 
the GDP (current prices) 23 .4 26.0 26.2 33.3 35.0 38.7 38.2 
Imports as a proportion of 
the GDP (constant prices) 2S.9 27.2 24.9 30.9 39.6 34.4 41. 7 24.1 
Coffee as a proportion of 
total exports 32.9 46.1 53.9 41.6 31.6 19 .6 24.8 26.5 w 
....... 
Bananas as a proportion of 
total exports 58.2 41.0 24.0 25.3 28.9 29.2 22.3 26.9 
Export price index (1966:100) 98.4 124.2 96.2 100.5 86.7 145.2 231.6 214.2 
Import or ice index (1966:100) 78.8 104 .1 95.l 99.3 99.4 182.7 252.l 308.2 
International terms-of-trade 124. 9 119.3 101.1 101.3 87.2 79.4 91.9 69.5 
Exports (million US$) 54.1 81.0 84.3 . 111.8 231.2 493.3 1'008 .1 868.9 
Imports (million US$) 45.7 87 .o 110.4 178.2 316.7 694.0 1,524.0 988.0 
Current account (million US$) 0.7 6.8 - 18.9 - 67.2 - 74.0 - 217.7 - 663.9 - 358.7 
Capital inflows (million US$) - 1. 7 10. 7 16.2 69.0 58.0 238.6 460.2 744.0 
Wholesale price index (66:100) 102. 9 95.9 97.6 99.2 125 .3 279.7 521.3 2,562.0 
Domestic terms-of-trade of 
agriculture (1966:100) 123. 78 103 .3 102.5 93.4 95.8 97.3 
- means not available. a/ 1957. Sources: References (21), (22)' (23)' (26), (27)' (28). 
Table 4. Costa Rica: Output and Structural Transformation Indicators, 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 
Structural composition of the 
GDP (Current'·prices) 
Agriculture 40.9 38.3 26.0 23.5 22.5 
Manufacturing 13.4 13.3 14.2 16.8 18.3 
Conunerce 19 .1 19.5 21.0 20.2 21.0 
Construction 4.4a 4.3. 4.7 4.3 
General Government 5.4 7.7 9.0 9.7 10.6 
Other 16.8 25.5 25.i 23.3 
Structural composition of the 
GDP (Constant prices) 
Agriculture 24.4a 25.2 22.9 24.1 
Manufacturing 14.1 a 13.8 16.7 18.6 
Commerce 20.7a 20.4 20.2 19.9 
Construction 4.6a 4.5 4.7 4 .1 
General Government 12.l a 11.3 10.8 9.9 
Other 24.1 24.8 24.7 23.4 
GDP in 1966 prices (million 
colones) 1,563 2,332 3,113 4,009 5,574 
- means not available 


















































Table 5. Costa Rica: Education and Social Indicators, 1950-
Illiteracy rates: 
Total population 10 









Population 15 years and older 






\.bmen 15-59 years old in 
school (%) 
Women 20-24 years old in 
school (%) 
Life expectancy (years) 
Social security coverage 
of labor force (%) 
Social security coverage 
of total population (%) 
- means not available 
Source: Reference (20). 
1950 
21.2 
20.9 
21.6 
8 .1 
28.5 
6.5 
9.4 
27.8 
29.2 
7.9 
1.5 
55.7 
23.0 
12. 0 
1963 
14.3 
14 .1 
14.5 
5.2 
19. 7 
4.0 
6.2 
19.2 
20.1 
17.2 
25.9 
u .8 
16.9 
17.4 
19.9 
5.2 
62.4 
29.0 
22.0 
1973 
1o.2 
10. 2 
10.3 
4.4 
14.7 
3.7 
5.1 
14.6 
14.8 
28.8 
29.9 
27. 9 
28.8 
28.7 
36.4 
14.9 
68.2 
50.0 
60.0 
... 
• 
.. 
.. 
